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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk

Judge Cooper of the United States district court, northern district of
New York, handed down a decision in the case of Harder vs Irwin, Col
lector of Internal Revenue, that is worthy of considerable attention. This
decision is embodied in treasury decision No. 3420 and is interesting
not so much because of the character of the question at issue as be
cause of the judge’s reasoning with respect to the time when gains and
profits of a corporation are accumulated.
The question at issue was whether dividends paid in 1917 were
paid out of gains and profits accumulated in prior years or whether
some portions of the said dividends were paid out of gains and profits
of 1917. It will be seen that the question arose under the provisions
of the revenue act of 1916. The section of this law applicable reads, in
part, as follows:
“Any distribution made * * * in the year 1917 * * * shall
be deemed to have been made from the most recently accumulated
undivided profits or surplus and shall constitute a part of the an
nual income of the distributee for the year in which received and
shall be taxed to the distributee at the rates prescribed by law
for the years in which such profits or surplus were accumulated by
the corporation.”
We do not agree with the judge in his opinion that the words “ac
cumulated undivided profits or surplus” can be interpreted as including
gains and profits that are in process of being made and can only be
known at a time when all the facts appertaining to them can be col
lected.
Accounting and bookkeeping methods with respect to the annual
determination of accumulated profits and losses are of so ancient a
character as to take rank with other common-law practices, as dis
tinguished from statutory law, and when congress deals with matters
appertaining to such commonly accepted practices it would seem rea
sonable to assume that it meant to restrict the limitations of the lan
guage employed to conform to what is generally accepted under such
practices.
It may not have occurred to the judge that a corporation’s current
business consists of a multiplicity of transactions, some of which re
sult in a profit and upon some of which a loss is sustained, and that it
is common practice to set aside a certain date each year to determine
the result of the aggregate of transactions to that date. There are com
paratively few corporations so well managed that their best informed
officers could estimate accurately the profits that have accrued (not
accumulated) to any particular date during the year unless the officers
went through the necessary routine that occurs at a closing period.
We believe the best-managed concerns would hesitate a long time be
fore they would declare a dividend out of earnings of a current (un-
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closed) year when there had been accumulated surplus or undivided
profits at the beginning of such year upon which to draw.
Profits are of a more or less evanescent character unless they result
from a cash transaction where the element of time taken in the comple
tion of the transaction is short. Generally speaking, profits need the
seasoning effect of time to become definitely assured. For example, we
draw attention to those corporations which because of supposed profits
in 1917 declared dividends during that year without taking into account
the excess-profits taxes that would have to be paid therefrom and found
themselves in the embarrassing position of having paid a portion of the
dividend out of capital.
We contend that the language “accumulated surplus and undivided
profits” naturally takes the meaning given to it by bookkeepers and
accountants, an interpretation which has the force and authority of a
business custom which because of the universality of its acceptance is
common law. We contend that the words surplus and undivided profits
are widely accepted as meaning an accumulation to a certain date of
gains and profits, as distinguished from profits and gains that are in
the making.
The judge in this case gave considerable attention to the proper
interpretation of the word “deemed” contained in the section of the
law quoted above. We believe he should have also concerned himself
with the interpretation of the word “accumulate.”
Webster’s International Dictionary defines this word, partly, as
follows:
“To heap up in a mass, to pile up, to collect or bring together.”
One could hardly be said to have accumulated anything during the
time when that which he is intending to accumulate is scattered, and
he knows not that he will eventually have any accumulation. A profit
or loss accrues until it can be ascertained to be such. It is customary
to endeavor to ascertain profits or losses once a year and from this
custom grew the practice of setting aside that which is accumulated
to that date and to record it in books of account as “surplus or undi
vided profits.”
It may be true, as the judge asserts, that congress intended to tax
dividends as if paid out of gains accruing in the year in which the divi
dends were paid. If it did so intend it was extremely unfortunate in
its selection of language to make its intention known.
Those who remember the language of the income-tax law of 1909
will not be surprised if congress does employ language the generallyaccepted meaning of which only remotely expresses its real intention.
We do not wonder, therefore, that a learned court spends so much
time in trying to determine the intention of congress, when adjudicating
a particular case, and perhaps we should not wonder if a court holds
that congress intends to imply a meaning of language quite contrary
to that generally accepted.
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TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3420—December 28, 1922)
Income tax—Revenue act 1916, as amended—Decision of court.
1. Statutory Presumption—The Word "Deemed" Conclusive.
The word “deemed” as used in section 31 (b) of the revenue act
of 1916, as amended by the act of October 3, 1917, providing that any
distribution of dividends made during the year 1917, or any subse
quent year, “shall be deemed to have been made from the most re
cently accumulated undivided profits or surplus,” creates a conclusive
presumption.
2. Dividends—“Undivided Profits or Surplus”—“Most Recently Accu
mulated”—Construction.
The words “most recently accumulated undivided profits or sur
plus,” as used in section 31 (b) of the revenue act of 1916, as amended
by the act of October 3, 1917, are broad enough to include corporate
profits earned during the current year in which the dividends are
declared, whether the books of the corporation have been balanced
or closed at any time during the year and such earnings actually set
aside as “undivided profits” or “surplus.”
3. Same—Presumption as to Earnings from which Paid.
Dividends paid by corporations in 1917 (except as to distributions
made prior to August 6 from profits accrued prior to March 1, 1913),
are conclusively presumed for the purpose of determining the rates
at which taxable to stockholders, to have been paid from the most
recently accumulated profits, including profits for 1917 regardless of
resolutions by the board of directors allocating such distributions to
profits earned in earlier years.
The appended decision of the United States district court for the
northern district of New York in the case of Fanny E. Harder v. Roscoe
Irwin, collector, is published for the information of internal revenue
officers and others concerned.
United States District Court, Northern District of New York.
Fanny E. Harder, plaintiff, v. Roscoe Irwin, collector of internal revenue
for the fourteenth district of New York, defendant.
Gilbert & Gilbert (A. S. Gilbert of counsel), attorneys for plaintiff.
Hiram C. Todd, United States attorney (Earl H. Gallup, assistant
United States attorney), for defendant.
Carl A. Mapes, Solicitor of Internal Revenue (Chester A. Gwinn,
attorney, treasury department), of counsel for defendant.
Cooper, Judge: This is an action brought by plaintiff to recover the
sum of $29,958.88 income tax for the year 1917, which she alleges was
illegally exacted from her by the defendant as internal-revenue collector.
The facts are substantially undisputed and are as follows: In 1917
and for some years prior thereto the High Rock Knitting Co. (hereinafter
referred to as the company or corporation) was a manufacturing concern
having its principal office and place of business at Philmont, N. Y. The
plaintiff was a stockholder, owning 1,200 shares of a total of 3,500 shares
of common stock of the corporation of the par value of $100 each. The
principal source of plaintiff’s income was from this stock.
On December 12, 1917, the board of directors of said corporation
adopted the following resolution:
Motions were then passed to declare and pay on December 15th to
common stockholders of record of that date the following dividends:
20% from cash surplus accumulated during 1916; 60% from cash surplus
accumulated during 1915; 120% from cash surplus accumulated prior to
December 31, 1913.
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On December 20, 1917, the corporation, pursuant to said resolution,
distributed in dividends the sum of $700,000, of which the plaintiff re
ceived $240,000; and in her income-tax return for the year 1917 plaintiff
reported the amount received by her from the High Rock Knitting Co.
and allocated 20 per cent thereof as taxable under the 1916 rates, 60 per
cent as taxable under the 1915 rates, and 120 per cent thereof as nontaxable, because declared by the resolution as payable out of profits ac
crued before March 1, 1913.
When the books for the year 1917 were audited by Price, Waterhouse
& Co., some time after the close of the calendar year, it was shown that
the profits of the company for the year 1917 were $424,958.53 after allow
ing $250,000 for corporate income tax for that year.
The internal revenue department, on auditing plaintiff’s return for
the year 1917, made the claim that the first $400,000 of the $700,000 dis
tributed by the company must be taken out of the earnings for the year
1917 and taxable to the stockholders at the rate in force at that year. The
department, therefore, imposed an additional assessment on the plaintiff in
the sum of $30,611.12, which she paid under protest. The plaintiff, upon a
reaudit of her account, conceded that all of the 1916 surplus had to be
exhausted before resorting to the accumulation prior to March 1, 1913,
and so claims only the sum of $29,958.88 as having been erroneously
assessed.
The case turns upon the construction to be given section 31 (b) of
the revenue act of 1916 as amended by the act of October 3, 1917 (40
Stat. 300).
The language of the section, so far as applicable to this case, is as
follows:
Any distribution made * * * in the year 1917 * * * shall be deemed to
have been made from the most recently accumulated undivided profits or
surplus, and shall constitute a part of the annual income of the distributee
for the year in which received and shall be taxed to the distributee at
the rates prescribed by law for the years in which such profits or surplus
were accumulated by the corporation.
Two questions are presented: (1) Whether the word “deemed” in sec
tion 31 (b) means a conclusive presumption or merely a rebuttable pre
sumption; (2) assuming that the word “deemed” is to be construed as an
absolute requirement or conclusive presumption, must corporate profits
earned in the year 1917 be included in the corporation’s “most recently
accumulated undivided profits or surplus” within the meaning of section
31 (b)?
To ascertain the intention of congress, it is necessary to refer briefly
to each income tax act since the adoption of the sixteenth amendment
with reference to its application to the distribution of the earnings of cor
porations to the shareholders thereof. Acts relating to income tax were
passed in 1913, 1916, and 1917.
Under the income-tax act of 1913, retroactive to March 1, 1913, divi
dends distributed during the taxable period of 1913 and the years of 1914,
1915 were taxable to the recipients under the “surtax” provision at the
rates current during those years, whether the profits out of which such
dividends were declared were accumulated before or after March 1, 1913.—
Lynch v. Hornby (247 U. S. 339) ; Southern Pacific v. Lowe (247 U. S.
330).
The 1916 act, however, permitted the declaration of dividends tax free
out of surplus created prior to March 1, 1913, even though profits earned
subsequent to March 1, 1913, remained undistributed; leaving dividends
declared from profits earned since March 1, 1913, taxable at the rate in
existence at the time such dividends were received by the stockholders,
as in the act of 1913.
Under the amendments of 1917, passed October 3, 1917, profits accu
mulated prior to March 1, 1913, might still be distributed tax free, “after
the distribution of earnings and profits accumulated since March 1, 1913,
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has been made,” and dividends paid from earnings accumulated since
March 1, 1913, were made taxable at the rates in effect during the years
when the profits out of which the dividends were made were accumulated,
instead of at the rates of the year in which they were distributed with a
new provision added that any distribution made during the, year 1917 or
any subsequent year “shall be deemed to have been made from the most
recently accumulated undivided profits or surplus.”
The act of October 3, 1917, was passed almost six months after the
United States had entered the world war, and was entitled “An act to
provide revenue to defray war expenses and for other purposes.”
Taxes and surtaxes were increased generally by this statute and it is
evident that the object of the statute was to raise large revenues needed
in emergency to successfully carry on the war.
The word “deemed,” as used in the amendment of 1917, is a transitive
verb defined in Webster’s new unabridged dictionary as “to set in judg
ment over or upon; to judge; also to pronounce judgment upon; to decide
—to regard.”
The word “deemed” has been judicially defined.
In Leonard v. Grant (5 Fed. 11, 16) it is stated that—
“deemed” is the equivalent of “considered” or “adjudged,” and, therefore,
whatever an act requires to be “deemed” or “taken” as true of any person
or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning such person or thing, and have full force and effect
accordingly.
In U. S. v. Doherty (27 Fed. 730, 734) it was thus defined:
“deemed” means “judge,” “determine,” or “consider.” The primary mean
ing of the word is to form a judgment; to conclude on consideration.
There are several other judicial expressions of the word “deemed,”
among them being in Walton v. Gavin (16 Q. B. 48, 81), where it was
stated that where a person was “deemed to be a soldier it must be under
stood to mean that he was thereafter to be taken in that capacity.
Also, in Cardinel v. Smith (5 Fed. Cas., 45, 47) the statute provided
that dealers in canned goods under certain circumstances shall be deemed
to be manufacturers and the court stated that they were to be held liable
as manufacturers, notwithstanding that they were not such in fact.
Other cases to the same effect are Lawrence & Co. v. Seyburn (202
Fed. 913), Michael v. Nann (101 Fed. 423, 424).
It is evident from the general scheme of the statute that it was the
intention of congress in the amendment of 1917 to require not only dis
tribution of the earnings and profits accruing since March 1, 1913, which
distribution is subject to tax, before there could be a tax free distribu
tion of earnings and profits accruing prior to that date, but also a distribu
tion of the most recent and most highly taxable profits or earnings before
resort could be had to the earlier profits even though earned since March
1, 1913, and therefore also taxable, but at a less rate. Section 31 (b)
of the 1917 amendment was enacted to express such purpose.
To permit the distributing corporation or the taxpayer to determine
out of what profits the dividends are distributed is out of harmony with
both the language of the section and the intent of the act.
The same section further provides that “this subdivision shall not
apply to any distribution made prior to August 6, 1917, out of earnings or
profits accrued to March 1, 1913.”
If the provision of section 31 (b) merely created a rebuttable pre
sumption enabling the corporation to elect out of what years accumulated
distributions are made, then there would have been no need for inserting
the provision exempting distributions made before to August 6, 1917, out
of earnings or profits accrued prior to March 1, 1913.
The corporation may not, therefore, by its act declare that its dis
tribution of dividends at any time after the act of October, 1917, is out
of profits accumulated in earlier years if there are profits of later years
untouched. To do so is void because in conflict with the statute. The
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statute means that regardless of the form of the declaration, it is con
clusively presumed that the distribution is out of the most recently accu
mulated undivided profits or surplus.
The second and more important question to be decided with refer
ence to dividends declared and paid in 1917, is, Must corporate profits
earned in the year 1917 be included in the corporation’s “most recently
accumulated undivided profits or surplus” within the meaning of the
statute?
Do these terms mean and include the current earnings of the calendar
or corporate fiscal year in which the distribution is made, or do they
mean only those accumulated prior to such calendar or fiscal year?
The plaintiff has shown that its books are fully audited and inventory
taken and profit and loss statement made up only once a year and at the
close of the calendar year.
The plaintiff has cited the works of accountants and others, upon au
thority of which counsel contends that the words of the statute can not
apply to and include the current earnings or profits down to the date of
the distribution because to do so is contrary to the practice of accounting
and bookkeeping and because actual profits can not be definitely known
without audit and inventory and appraisal, which is customarily done
once a year, and directors can not be presumed to have voted or intended
to vote to declare dividends payable out of earnings up to the minute, for
at best they can but guess before an audit and inventory, and a wrong
guess subjects them to personal liability. Counsel for plaintiff insists
congress must be deemed to have known the principles and practice of
corporate accounting, and that congress must be presumed to have framed
its act of 1917 in the light of such knowledge.
There is undoubtedly much force to that contention.
But congress must also be presumed to know that few corporations
pay dividends annually only; that the great majority of dividend-paying
corporations declare dividends quarterly or semiannually and pay them
out of earnings or profits very recently earned, whatever be the form of
bookkeeping entry; sometimes, when none are earned, resorting to the
surplus of previous years.
Congress also knew that the war upon which the nation had just
embarked might, and probably would, be a great disturbance to some
kinds of business. To some corporations or persons manufacturing things
needed for the prosecution of the war, great profits would accrue. The
business of others might be greatly injured, if not destroyed, by the re
strictions upon transportation, use of material, labor supply, and perhaps
in other ways. Such latter corporations might have considerable losses
instead of profits and would have to draw on the surplus and undivided
profits of more prosperous times to pay any dividends at all.
To have declared by statute that any dividends declared after the act
of 1917 must be conclusively presumed to be distribution of current earn
ings and taxable at the war rates of the 1917 act, and counsel for plain
tiff contends congress could and would have said so if it meant to include
such earnings, would have worked much hardship and defeated to some
extent the purpose of the act of 1917. That act was intended to greatly
increase the revenue from the income tax. To have declared that all
dividends must be conclusively presumed to have been distributed out of
current profits or earnings in cases when there were none, would have
interfered with congress’s purpose in at least these respects:
1. The government would not be able to collect any taxes upon divi
dends of loss-making corporations, no matter how great their previous
surplus, because loss-making corporations could not be compelled to, and
would not, declare any such highly taxable dividends in the losing years
out of previous profits and, therefore, there would be nothing to tax.
2. The stockholder would suffer because instead of getting dividends
regularly in lean years from the accumulations of the fat years, as in the
case of most stable corporations, he would get no dividends at all.
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3. The stock upon cessation of dividends would materially depreciate
in value, causing loss to the owner and possibly tending to unsettle the
value of other stocks.
Confronted with the necessity of raising more revenue for war pur
poses and not wishing to defeat its purpose or penalize any loss-making
corporation, and deter it from declaring dividends out of former profits,
congress could not well enact that distributions in 1917 and subsequent
years shall be deemed or conclusively presumed to have been made from
the earnings or profits of the time of the distribution, when in fact there
might be loss instead of profit, and, therefore, had to resort to language
which would permit the loss-making corporation to declare dividends,
though not earned in that year, out of previous profits and have them
taxed at the rate prevailing in the year in which earned, and at the same
time tax the profit-making corporation at the war rate on the distributions
of the current war profits.
Accordingly congress enacted in 1917 that distributions after August
6, 1917, “shall be deemed to have been made from the most recently ac
cumulated undivided profits or surplus” and “shall be taxed to the dis
tributee at the rates prescribed by law for the years in which such profits
or surplus were accumulated.”
By this language a loss-making corporation could declare dividends
after the act out of the most recently accumulated profits or surplus and
the stockholder would be taxed at the rate of the year in which the profits
were earned, and a profit-making corporation’s dividend distributions
would be taxed at the war rate.
To compel distribution of the war profits, section 10 (b) was in
serted in the 1917 amendment, providing for a tax on corporations, in
addition to all other taxes, of 10 per cent on earnings not distributed
within six months after the end of the calendar year in which earned,
except such part thereof as might actually be invested or employed in the
business, and in case of fraud in the amount of profits claimed to have
been invested in the business the tax was 15 per cent instead of 10
per cent.
Under all the previous income-tax laws, dividends were taxable in the
year when received. The 1916 act did not change the law in this respect,
but permitted dividends declared from earnings accrued previous to
March 1, 1913, to be distributed tax free. There was no question, then,
under the acts of 1913 and 1916 whether the distributions of the current
year were taxable or not, as such distributions were expressly made sub
ject to tax at the rate of the year when received, except, of course, dis
tributions from earnings accumulated prior to March 1, 1913.
Is it conceivable that in 1917, with the country engaged in the great
est war in history, when more money was needed than ever before,
congress would deliberately change the income-law and instead of having
income taxes coming in yearly on dividends distributed each year, regard
less of when earned, except when earned before March 1, 1913, would pro
vide for an interval of a whole year when no taxes could be levied on divi
dend distributions in 1917 unless distributed from the accumulated earn
ings of previous years? The answer must be evident.
The later act passed in 1919, containing an additional provision that
any distribution made after the first 60 days of a taxable year shall be
“deemed to have been made from the earnings or profits accumulated
between the close of the preceding taxable year and the date of distribu
tion, to the extent of such earnings or profits.”
Had this language been used in the statute of 1917, this case would
probably not have arisen.
The amendment enacted in 1919 was evidently not to change the
statute but to clarify it.
So considered it supports the views above set forth.
The plaintiff relies upon the definition given the words “accumulated
undivided profits or surplus” by works on accounting. While it is un
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doubtedly true these works are recognized as authorities for bookkeepers
and accountants, and might have been known by some members of con
gress when the legislation in question was enacted, nevertheless it is
apparent that this statute was prepared for the general public and the
ordinary interpretation of the words must be taken rather than any tech
nical limitation which may be placed upon them by experts. In a tech
nical sense, no profits become undivided profits or surplus until they have
been set aside at the end of an accounting period and allocated to certain
funds known to accountants and bookkeepers as “undivided profits or
surplus.”
Montgomery on Auditing, Theory and Practice, pages 199-205, recog
nizes the distinction between the common significance and the technical
understanding of the word, “surplus.”
In Lewis-Southerland Statutory Construction (vol. 2, 2d ed., p.
753), it is stated—Words in common use, and also having a technical
sense, will, in acts intended for general expression and not dealing
especially with the subject to which such words in a technical sense
apply, be understood primarily in their public sense, unless they are
defined in the act or a contrary intention is otherwise manifest.
In common phraseology, “surplus” is that which remains when use
or need is satisfied; it is the excess or overplus.
The word “surplus” has been judicially defined as “that which re
mains after expenses and dividends.” (Words and Phrases, vol. 4, p. 607.)
“Profits” has ordinarily been designated as the gain made in any busi
ness or investment, both receipts and payments taken into consideration.
—Burdett v. Estey (3 Fed. 566, 569) ; Providence Rubber Co. v. Good
year (76 U. S. 788).
The treasury department regulation, known as article 107, regula
tions No. 33 (revised), has stated the department’s construction of sec
tion 31 (b) of the act of 1917 in the following language:
If a corporation distributed dividends in 1917, such dividends will be
deemed to have been paid from the earnings of 1917, and the recipient,
if an individual, will be liable to additional tax, if any, and if a corpora
tion, to income tax at the rates for the year 1917, unless it be shown to
the satisfaction of the commissioner of internal revenue that at the time
such dividends were paid the earnings up to that time were not sufficient
to cover the distribution, in which case the excess over the earnings of
the taxable year will be deemed to have been paid from the most recently
accumulated surplus of prior years and will be taxed at the rate or rates
for the year or years in which earned.
This construction is in entire harmony with the views herein set
forth.
When the meaning of a statute is doubtful, great weight should be
given to the construction placed upon it by the department charged with
its execution.—United States v. Herman (209 U. S. 339).
It is not necessary, however, in this case to resort to the construction
by the department.
Any other construction would make great confusion in respect to all
the quarterly and semiannual dividends paid in 1917 and intended to be
distributed from the earnings of that year, upon which tax at the war
rate of 1917 has undoubtedly been paid by multitudes of taxpayers for
the year 1917.
Despite the inhibition contained in the statute against distribution
of profits accrued before March 1, 1913, until the most recently accumu
lated undivided profits or surplus were disposed of, the corporation allo
cated $366,189.19 of the earnings and profits accrued prior to March 1,
1913, to the payment of the $700,000 dividend declared and distributed
in December, 1917. The plaintiff taxpayer made a like proportionate
allocation. The prorated earnings of 1917 to December 20, the date of the
distribution of the aforesaid dividend, were $410,987.29, and yet the claim
is that no part of these earnings were used in the payment of the divi
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dend. It can not under a fair construction of the statute be denied that
the earnings and profits for the year 1917 were undivided profits, nor
can it be disputed that they were the most recently accumulated earnings
and profits which had accrued since March 1, 1913. The dividend must be
conclusively presumed to have been paid from these profits of the year
1917 to the extent thereof, up to the date of declaration of dividend, re
gardless of the language of the resolution or the intent of the company.
The assessment was properly levied against the plaintiff and her com
plaint must be dismissed.

COLORADO SOCIETY OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS
At the annual meeting of the Colorado Society of Certified Public
Accountants, the following officers were elected for the ensuing year:
Ralph B. Mayo, president; Louis C. Linck, A. M. Strong and F. Elwood
Hunt, vice-presidents; W. J. Thompson, treasurer; T. J. Witting, secre
tary and C. T. Flynn, auditor.

COLORADO STATE BOARD OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS
C. F. Helwig of Denver, has been appointed to succeed R. M. Crane
on the Colorado state board of accountancy. The officers of the board for
the coming year are T. Raymond Young, president; T. J. Witting, secre
tary; C. F. Helwig, treasurer.

CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY
The governor of Connecticut has appointed Herbert F. Seward of
New Haven, Connecticut, to membership in the state board of account
ancy for the term of three years in succession to John Starkweather of
Ansonia.
F. W. Lafrentz and A. F. Lafrentz announce the formation of the firm
of F. W. Lafrentz & Company to continue the practice heretofore con
ducted by them under the name of The American Audit Company.
Robert S. Pasley and Thomas F. Conroy announce that hereafter
they will practise under the firm name of Pasley & Conroy, with offices
at 67 Wall street, New York.
Smith, Brodie, Lunsford & Wright of Kansas City, Missouri, an
nounce that A. F. Brodie has retired, and that the firm hereafter will
practise under the firm name of Smith, Lunsford & Wright.

Robert J. Hyland and Francis William Hopkins announce the con
solidation of their practices under the firm name of Hyland & Hopkins,
with offices at 126 Liberty street, New York.
Wilson J. Henry and Charles A. Wright announce the formation of
a partnership, practising under the firm name of Henry & Wright, with
offices at 508-512 Manhattan building, Muskogee, Oklahoma.

A. S. Fedde, Walter E. Williams and E. J. Schmiel announce the
formation of a partnership, under the firm name of A. S. Fedde & Co.,
with offices at 55 Liberty street, New York.

It is announced that the practice of the Certified Audit Company of
America, Inc., New York, will be conducted hereafter under the firm
name of Edward M. Hyans & Co.
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